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David versus Godzilla: Bigger Stones
Jerry Ellig*& Richard Williams**
ABSTRACT
For four decades, U.S. Presidents have issued executive orders
requiring agencies to conduct comprehensive regulatory impact
analysis (RIA) for significant regulations to ensure that regula-
tory decisions solve social problems in a cost-beneficial manner.
Yet experience demonstrates that agency RIAs often fail to live
up to the standards enunciated in executive orders and Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) guidance.  The Office of Infor-
mation and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) oversees agency compli-
ance with the executive orders, but OIRA is about half the size it
was when it was established in 1980.  Regulatory agency staff out-
number OIRA staff by a ratio of 3600 to 1.  We suggest four
managerial changes that could increase OIRA’s leverage:  (1)
Define what counts as success when an agency adopts a regula-
tion and link this to the agency’s strategic goals, (2) Use budget
recommendations to enforce analytical requirements and
achievement of agencies’ Government Performance and Results
Act (GPRA) objectives, (3) Combine regulatory budgets with
agency budgets, and (4) Reward results, not activity.
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INTRODUCTION
When General George Washington makes his entrance in the
hit Broadway musical Hamilton, his first words are, “We are out-
gunned . . . outmanned . . . outnumbered . . . outplanned.”1  Wash-
ington presciently described the position of the Chief Executive—
and his Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)—
vis-à-vis the administrative agencies that write regulations.  Since
1981, OIRA’s regulatory review responsibilities have waxed and
waned with the volume of regulations subject to review.  Over that
same time period, the office acquired major new responsibilities,
such as production of the annual report to Congress on the benefits
and costs of federal regulations.  Since April 2018, a Memorandum
of Agreement between the Department of the Treasury and the
OMB also tasked OIRA with reviewing Internal Revenue Service
rules, which it did not previously review.2  Yet OIRA’s staff has
shrunk from 97 in 1980 to about 56 today, while the number of reg-
ulators in agencies grew from 115,000 in 1980 to 201,170 in 2010—
an increase of 75 percent.3  Regulatory agency staff outnumbers
OIRA staff by almost 3600 to 1.4  Given the enormous disparities in
1. Original Broadway Cast of Hamilton, Right Hand Man, on HAMILTON
(ORIGINAL BROADWAY CAST RECORDING) (Atlantic Records 2015).
2. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, MEMORANDUM
OF AGREEMENT, REVIEW OF TAX REGULATIONS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER
12,866 (2018).
3. Figures were calculated by authors from data in MARK FEBRIZIO & ME-
LINDA WARREN, REGULATORS’ BUDGET: OVERALL SPENDING AND STAFFING RE-
MAIN STABLE app. A-3 (2020).  Calculations exclude independent regulatory
agencies and the Transportation Security Administration, which accounts for more
than 56,000 full-time equivalent employees because it took over airport security
screening after 9/11.  OIRA’s full-time equivalent employees have increased
slightly from a low of 44 in 2010. .
4. Id.
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resources and the significant potential reductions in human welfare
if regulation is not adequately informed by economic analysis, this
is truly a matchup of David versus Godzilla.5
All Presidents since President Reagan have issued executive
orders requiring agencies to conduct comprehensive regulatory im-
pact analysis (RIA) for significant regulations to ensure that regula-
tory decisions solve social problems in a cost-beneficial manner.6
President Clinton’s Executive Order 12,866 outlines the principal
requirements that currently apply.7  Every subsequent administra-
tion has reaffirmed Executive Order 12,866.8
However, experience demonstrates that the executive orders,
and OMB guidance9 implementing the executive orders, have been
insufficient to ensure that regulation accomplishes important public
goals without imposing unnecessary costs on the economy.  Even
when agencies conduct detailed RIAs, there are often significant
gaps in the agency’s analysis.10  The quality of the analyses and the
use of economic analysis to inform regulatory decisions falls far
short of the standards enunciated in executive orders.  Consider
that in any given year, an analysis of both monetized benefits and
monetized costs accompanies less than one-third of all major final
rules.11  This rate is a considerable failure, since economically sig-
nificant rules represent only about one percent of all rules.
5. Accountability and Transparency Reform at the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Gov’t Operations of the H.
Comm on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (2016) (“David vs. Godzilla,
OIRA and the Federal Agencies” testimony by Richard A. Williams, Vice President
of Policy Research and Director of Regulatory Studies Program, Mercatus Center,
George Mason University).
6. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1981).
7. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993).
8. Exec. Order 13,258, 3 C.F.R. § 13258 (2002); Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3
C.F.R. § 13563 (2011); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, M-17-21, GUIDANCE IMPLE-
MENTING EXECUTIVE ORDER 13,771, TITLED “REDUCING REGULATION AND CON-
TROLLING REGULATORY COSTS” (2017) (“In addition, EO 12866 remains the
primary governing EO regarding regulatory planning and review.  Accordingly,
among other requirements, except where prohibited by law, agencies must con-
tinue to assess and consider both the benefits and costs of regulatory actions, in-
cluding deregulatory actions, when making regulatory decisions, and issue
regulations only upon a reasoned determination that benefits justify costs.”).
9. U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4, REGULATORY ANALY-
SIS (2003), https://bit.ly/2OkNZEQ [https://perma.cc/3F68-LQ38].
10. See infra Section I.
11. A “major” rule is a rule whose economic impact exceeds $100 million an-
nually.  Major rules include economically significant rules from executive branch
agencies and rules with equivalent impact from independent agencies. See Richard
Williams, Comparison of Final Rules with Monetized Benefits and Costs, MER-
CATUS CTR. AT GEORGE MASON UNIV. (Apr. 23, 2012), https://bit.ly/3fnLJIX
[https://perma.cc/G3ND-EN53]; Jerry Ellig, Evaluating the Quality and Use of Reg-
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Perhaps the most significant failure, beyond incomplete analy-
sis of proposed regulations, is the failure to track successes and fail-
ures of regulatory agencies.  As a result, neither the President, nor
Congress, nor the public have any knowledge of whether the bil-
lions (if not trillions) of dollars of expenditures to produce and
comply with regulations are improving outcomes for the American
people.  In fact, even the agencies themselves do not know whether
their regulatory programs are making improvements.  Without such
information, knowing which programs, or even agencies, should
continue to receive funding is impossible, even if the program or
agency appears to be well-intentioned.
The partial government shutdown in January 2019 provides
further evidence of public confusion.  While some worried about
falling airplanes or food contamination outbreaks, others noted
that, outside of Washington and dire news reports, people not di-
rectly involved in the regulatory world did not notice anything
wrong.12
To have the best possible chance of achieving positive regula-
tory outcomes, agencies must clearly identify their goals for a par-
ticular regulation and choose the best option to achieve those goals.
A good RIA can help agencies do both.  The executive orders and
OMB guidance lay out sound principles to guide regulatory analysis
and decisions.  We propose four managerial steps any administra-
tion could take to better enforce the requirements in the executive
orders and to help ensure positive outcomes from regulatory pro-
grams:  (1) Define success at the outset and link regulations to the
agency’s strategic goals, (2) Use budget recommendations to en-
force analytical requirements and achievement of agency GPRA
objectives, (3) Link requests for fiscal budgets to regulatory budgets
in the President’s annual budget requests, and (4) Reward regula-
tory results, not regulatory activity.
Part I of this Article outlines the fundamental elements that a
thorough RIA should include.  Part I also discusses empirical re-
search demonstrating that the quality and use of RIAs often falls
short of the ideals envisioned in the executive orders and the Gov-
ernment Performance Results Act.  Part II outlines our four
proposals.
ulatory Impact Analysis: The Mercatus Center’s Regulatory Report Card, 2008–2013
11–12 (Mercatus Ctr. at George Mason Univ., Working Paper, 2016).
12. McKay Coppins, Waiting for a Shutdown to End in Disaster, ATLANTIC
(Jan. 18, 2019), https://bit.ly/304IIqs [https://perma.cc/P9AZ-7W4E].
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I. ANALYSIS, REVIEW, AND OVERSIGHT FALL SHORT
For nearly four decades, Presidents have required executive
branch regulatory agencies to conduct economic analysis to inform
the agencies’ decisions about regulations.13  Under President Rea-
gan’s Executive Order 12,291, OIRA reviewed all executive branch
regulations.  Under President Clinton’s Executive Order 12,866,
OIRA reviewed only “significant” regulations—generally, regula-
tions that have an effect on the economy exceeding $100 million
annually, have other material adverse effects, conflict with other
agencies’ actions, materially affect federal spending or loan pro-
grams, or raise novel legal or policy issues.14  Regulations with eco-
nomic effects exceeding $100 million annually or certain other
material adverse effects listed in the executive order are often re-
ferred to as “economically significant,” although that term of art
appears nowhere in the executive order.15
The most extensive RIA requirements apply to economically
significant regulations.  A thorough RIA should do at least these
four things:
(1) Assess the nature and significance of the problem the
agency is trying to solve so the agency knows whether there is a
problem that could be solved through regulation and, if so, the
agency can tailor a solution that will effectively solve the problem;16
(2) Identify a wide variety of alternative solutions;17
(3) Define the benefits the agency seeks to achieve in terms of
ultimate outcomes that affect citizens’ quality of life, and assess
each alternative’s ability to achieve those outcomes;18
(4) Identify the good things that regulated entities, consumers,
and other stakeholders must sacrifice in order to achieve the de-
sired outcomes under each alternative.19  In economics jargon,
these sacrifices are known as “costs,” but just like benefits, costs
may involve far more than monetary expenditures.20
Without this information, agencies base regulatory choices on
intuition (which may be faulty) or simply faith that the regulation
13. See Jerry Ellig & Jerry Brito, Toward a More Perfect Union: Regulatory
Analysis and Performance Management, 8 FLA. ST. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 21–31
(2009).
14. Exec. Order 12,866, supra note 7, § 3(f).
15. OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, Regulations and
the Rulemaking Process, https://bit.ly/32Z8yiK [https://perma.cc/W6EC-HC9W].
16. Exec. Order 12,866, supra note 7, §§ 1(b)(1), 6(a)(3)(B)(i).
17. Id. § 6(a)(3)(C)(iii).
18. Id. §§ 6(a)(3)(C)(i), (iii).
19. Id.
20. See id. See also U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 9.
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will produce a positive outcome.  Given the enormous influence
that both the benefits and costs of regulation have on our daily
lives, decision-makers have a responsibility to act based on knowl-
edge of a regulation’s likely effects.
Regulatory review by OIRA is the President’s principal institu-
tional tool for managing the development of regulations.  Different
administrations may have different approaches and emphases,21 but
it is clear that Presidents of both political parties value centralized
regulatory review.22  It is also clear that enforcement has been a
major issue for Presidents from both parties.  For example, Presi-
dent Carter commented that although he knew “dealing with the
federal bureaucracy would be one of the worst problems [he] would
have to face,” at the end he realized it had been even “worse than
[he] had anticipated.”23
Some evidence shows that the requirements in the executive
orders, coupled with review by OIRA, have induced agencies to
engage in more thorough analysis than they otherwise would have.
For example, “prescriptive” regulations that contain mandates or
prohibitions receive more intensive OIRA review than regulations
that implement budget programs, and prescriptive regulations tend
to have more thorough RIAs.24  Agencies also produce higher qual-
ity RIAs when OIRA reviews the regulation for a longer period of
time.25  Agencies produce lower quality analysis and explain how
the analysis influences decisions less extensively when OIRA is
headed by an acting administrator, who has less political clout in
the administration than a presidential appointee.26  Case studies
21. See generally, Sally Katzen, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Where Should We Go
from Here?, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1313 (2006).
22. See id.; Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House
Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1080–82 (1986). See also
Eric Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political
Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137 (2001) (arguing that presidents, re-
gardless of ideology, can use analytical requirements and centralized regulatory
review to mitigate the principal-agent problems inherent in managing regulatory
agencies).
23. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2273
(2001).
24. See Patrick A. McLaughlin & Jerry Ellig, Does OIRA Review Improve the
Quality of Regulatory Impact Analysis? Evidence from the Final Year of the Bush
II Administration, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 179, 181 (2011).
25. See Jerry Ellig & Rosemarie Fike, Regulatory Process, Regulatory Reform,
and the Quality of Regulatory Impact Analysis, 7 J. BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 523
(2016); Stuart Shapiro & John F. Morrall III, Does Haste Make Waste? How Long
Does it Take to Do a Good Regulatory Impact Analysis, 20 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 1
(2013).
26. Ellig & Fike, supra note 25, at 539–40 (finding that an acting OIRA ad-
ministrator is negatively correlated with the quality of economic analysis); Ellig,
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document instances in which regulatory analysis helped improve
regulatory decisions by providing additional options regulators
could consider or unearthing new information about benefits or
costs of particular modifications to the regulation.27
For example, in his case study of a 2004 Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) regulation requiring power plants to design
cooling water intake structures that minimize harm to marine orga-
nisms, Scott Farrow concluded, “EPA clearly chose an approach
that imposed a considerably lighter burden on society . . . . The
record provides substantial evidence that the agency considered a
lower-cost alternative to meeting a standard with the potential to
save approximately $3 billion in annualized dollars or approxi-
mately $40 billion in present value.”28
Thus, evidence suggests that RIAs can make a difference.
Nevertheless, the quality and use of regulatory impact analysis fall
far short of the ideals enunciated in Executive Order 12,866:
• Scholarly research reveals that, in many cases, RIAs are not
sufficiently complete to serve as a guide to agency deci-
sions.  The quality of the analysis varies widely, and even
the most elaborate analyses still have problems.29  Survey-
supra note 11, at 73–75 (finding that an acting OIRA administrator is negatively
correlated with the quality of economic analysis  of  alternatives, benefits, and the
extent to which the agency explained how the analysis affected its decisions);
Reeve Bull and Jerry Ellig, Statutory Rulemaking Considerations and Judicial Re-
view of Regulatory Impact Analysis, 70 ADMIN. LAW REV. 873, 937 (2018) (finding
that an acting OIRA administrator is negatively correlated with the quality of eco-
nomic analysis of alternatives, benefits, and the extent to which the agency ex-
plained how the analysis affected its decisions).
27. REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS (Winston Harrington et al.
eds., 2009); RICHARD D. MORGENSTERN, ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA: ASSESS-
ING REGULATORY IMPACT (1997); THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RA-
TIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL
BUREAUCRACY (1991).
28. Scott Farrow, Improving the CWIS Rule Regulatory Analysis: What Does
an Economist Want?, in REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 176, 182
(Winston Harrington et al. eds., 2009).
29. See Art Fraas & Randall Lutter, The Challenges of Improving the Eco-
nomic Analysis of Pending Regulations: The Experience of OMB Circular A-4, 3
ANN. REV. OF RES. ECON. 71 (2010); Jamie Belcore & Jerry Ellig, Homeland Se-
curity and Regulatory Analysis: Are We Safe Yet?, 40 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (2008); Rob-
ert W. Hahn, Jason Burnett, Yee-Ho I. Chan, Elizabeth Mader & Petrea Moyle,
Assessing Regulatory Impact Analyses: The Failure of Agencies to Comply with Ex-
ecutive Order 12,866, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 859 (2000); Robert W. Hahn &
Patrick Dudley, How Well Does the Government Do Cost-Benefit Analysis?, 1
REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 192 (2007); Robert W. Hahn & Robert Litan, Count-
ing Regulatory Benefits and Costs: Lessons for the U.S. and Europe, 8 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 473 (2005); Robert W. Hahn, Randall W. Lutter & W. Kip Viscusi, Do
Federal Regulations Reduce Mortality?, AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CT. FOR REG.
STUDIES (2000).
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ing the scholarly evidence on regulatory analysis, Robert
Hahn and Paul Tetlock conclude that economic analysis has
not had much impact, and the general quality of regulatory
analysis is low.30
• A Government Accountability Office (GAO) study ex-
amined the analysis accompanying a sample of 57 economi-
cally significant regulations issued between July 2011 and
July 2013.31  All included a statement explaining the need
for the regulation and some discussion of benefits and
costs.32  Of those regulations, however, 19 percent included
no discussion of alternatives, 24 percent had no monetary
estimate of benefits, and 63 percent failed to calculate net
benefits (benefits minus costs).33  GAO emphasized that it
only looked to see whether these elements were present or
absent in the analysis; it did not evaluate their quality.34
• The Regulatory Report Card project at the Mercatus
Center at George Mason University assessed the quality
and use of RIAs for economically significant, prescriptive
regulations that cleared OIRA review between 2008 and
2013.  It awarded scores that range from 0 to 20 points for
the quality of analysis.35  For the period 2008 to 2013, the
average Report Card score for “prescriptive” regulations
that contain mandates or prohibitions was 10.7 out of 20
possible points.36  That is equivalent to an “F.”  The high-
30. Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock, Has Economic Analysis Improved
Regulatory Decisions?, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 67, 72–78 (2008).  Most of the scholarly
research focuses on effects of the Regulatory Impact Analysis, which is often writ-
ten after major decisions are made.  This may not account for economists’ behind-
the-scenes influence as the regulation is being developed.
31. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-714, FEDERAL
RULEMAKING: AGENCIES INCLUDED KEY ELEMENTS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS,
BUT EXPLANATIONS OF REGULATIONS’ SIGNIFICANCE COULD BE MORE TRANS-
PARENT (2014).
32. Id. at 22–27.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 4.
35. The Report Card originally consisted of 12 criteria based on requirements
in Executive Order 12,866.  Trained evaluators award the RIA a score of 0–5
points on each criterion.  It was later revised to cover six criteria based on the
Executive Order’s substantive requirements.  The scoring methodology has been
published in a peer-reviewed journal, and statistical analysis finds that the evalu-
ator training results in consistent scoring across evaluators. See Jerry Ellig & Pat-
rick A.  McLaughlin, The Quality and Use of Regulatory Analysis in 2008, 32 RISK
ANALYSIS 255 (2012).  For an explanation of the scoring systems and steps taken to
ensure that the scores are comparable across the two systems, see Ellig, supra note
11, at 14–17.
36. Ellig, supra note 11, at 18.
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est-scoring regulation ever evaluated received 18 points,
equivalent to an A-.37
• The number of regulations accompanied by information on
monetized benefits and costs is only a tiny fraction of the
overall number of proposed rules.38  For example, between
2008 and 2013, agencies proposed 14,795 federal regula-
tions.  About 9.5 percent of these were considered signifi-
cant and hence eligible for OIRA review.  About two
percent of the rules were economically significant, with a
full RIA required.  Of the 1 percent of rules that were pre-
scriptive regulations rather than budget regulations, only
82—0.6 percent of all rules proposed—had monetized
figures for both benefits and costs.39
• For two-thirds of the economically significant, proposed
regulations that cleared OIRA review between 2008 and
2013, agencies provided no explanation of how they used
the RIA to inform their decisions.40
• While executive branch oversight by OIRA has helped, one
former OIRA administrator described OIRA oversight as
producing “marginal results.”41
Myriad causes contribute to these shortcomings in the quality
and use of regulatory analysis and the failures of regulatory agen-
cies to report outcome results of their regulatory programs.  Schol-
ars and commentators have written extensively about the need for
new executive orders42 or legislation43 to correct the problem.
Here, however, we focus on managerial reforms that any adminis-
tration could implement without new executive orders or
legislation.
37. Id.
38. Williams, supra note 11.
39. Ellig, supra note 11, at 11–12.
40. Ellig, supra note 11, at 25.
41. Christopher DeMuth, OIRA at Thirty, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 15, 19 (2011).
42. Robert Hahn & Cass Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving
Federal Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
1489 (2002).
43. Christopher Walker, Modernizing the Administrative Procedure Act, 69
ADMIN. L. REV. 629 (2017).
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II. IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF REGULATORY IMPACT
ANALYSIS
A. Define Success at the Outset and Link to the Agency’s
Strategic Goals
Agencies often fail to adequately assess the nature and signifi-
cance of the problems they are trying to solve with regulations, de-
spite specific language in Executive Order 12,866 directing them to
do so.44  As a result, agencies often fail to indicate clearly what
counts as a successful outcome of a proposed regulation and how
long a regulation needs to achieve a successful outcome.  Conse-
quently, it is hard to identify whether the agency is making pro-
gress, the point at which the regulation will no longer be necessary,
or the point at which the regulation largely solves the problem and
no additional regulation will be necessary.  Without this informa-
tion, regulations are likely to be less effective and more costly than
necessary.
The GAO and independent scholars have found that few agen-
cies engage in genuine retrospective review of regulations—i.e.,
evaluations to ascertain the actual benefits and costs of regulations
after they are implemented.45  Scholars and policymakers repeat-
edly call for greater focus on retrospective analysis of regulations.46
Just one economically significant regulation proposed between 2008
and 2013 had an RIA that included a reasonably complete frame-
work for retrospective analysis of the regulation’s effects.47  Indeed,
it is difficult to find any discussion of goals, measures, or provisions
for retrospective review at all in the Notices of Proposed Rulemak-
ing or RIAs for economically significant regulations proposed dur-
44. Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 7, § 1(b)(1).
45. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-791, RE-EXAMINING
REGULATIONS: OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS AND TRANS-
PARENCY OF RETROSPECTIVE REVIEWS 4–8 (2007); Randall Lutter, The Role of
Retrospective Analysis and Review in Regulatory Policy, 10–15 (Mercatus Ctr. at
George Mason Univ., Working Paper No. 12-14, 2012); JOSEPH E. ALDY, LEARN-
ING FROM EXPERIENCE: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RETROSPECTIVE REVIEWS OF
AGENCY RULES AND THE EVIDENCE FOR IMPROVING THE DESIGN AND IMPLE-
MENTATION OF REGULATORY POLICY (2014).
46. In 2002, Robert Hahn and Cass Sunstein recommended that agencies
should be required to generate retrospective analysis of their major regulations
with the help of OIRA in identifying which regulations qualify as major and thus
worthy of retrospective analysis. See Hahn and Sunstein, supra note 42, at
1527–28.  In 2006, former OIRA administrator Sally Katzen recommended agen-
cies focus less on cost-benefit analysis methodology and instead focus on retro-
spective review, believing that society would get more rational regulations if an
agency’s limited resources were spent examining previous regulations and institu-
tions. See Katzen, supra note 21, at 1319.
47. Ellig, supra note 11, at 26.
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ing those years—even when the RIA contained information that
agencies could have used to develop goals, measures, and retro-
spective review plans.48  The quality of analysis criterion with the
lowest score is analysis of the systemic problem the regulation seeks
to solve, another critical piece of information needed to define what
counts as success.49
President Carter’s Executive Order 12,044, issued 42 years ago,
provided that an agency head could not approve a regulation until
determining that the agency had developed a plan to evaluate the
regulation after it was implemented.50  Subsequent executive orders
all had provisions requiring agencies to develop plans for retrospec-
tive review of existing regulations, and the orders empowered ei-
ther the OMB Director or the Vice President to designate
regulations that should be reviewed.51  None, however, continued
the Carter approach of requiring the agency to develop a retrospec-
tive review plan before an agency could issue the regulation.
President Trump’s Executive Order 13,771 motivated agencies
to initiate extensive retrospective analysis efforts by imposing incre-
mental regulatory budgeting and requiring agencies to remove two
existing regulations for each new one.52  Agencies now find them-
selves in the difficult position of trying to identify which existing
regulations are the best candidates for review.  The absence of clear
agency goals and measures for regulations hampers retrospective
review because it is not always clear what analysts or decision-mak-
ers should observe that would tell them whether the regulation is
accomplishing its goals, or at what cost.
The 2-for-1 and regulatory budgeting requirements in Execu-
tive Order 13,771 have been controversial,53 and future administra-
tions may or may not continue these requirements.  But there is
another method, already authorized in existing law, that an admin-
istration can use to motivate retrospective analysis.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 19.
50. Exec. Order 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661, § 2(d)(8) (1978).
51. Id. § 4; Exec. Order 12,291, supra note 6, § 3(i); Exec. Order 12,866, supra
note 7, § 5; Exec. Order 13,258, 3 C.F.R § 13258, § 10 (2002); Exec. Order 13,563,
supra note 8, at § 1.
52. Exec. Order 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (2017).
53. See, e.g., Bridget C.E. Dooling, Update: Litigation Challenging Trump’s
Regulatory “Two for One” EO, YALE J. ON REG. (Sept. 4, 2018), https://bit.ly/
328FSDB [https://perma.cc/434X-7BUN]; Jodi L. Short, The Trouble with Count-
ing: Cutting Through the Rhetoric of Red Tape Cutting, 103 MINN. L. REV. 93, 94
(2018); Caroline Cecot & Michael A. Livermore, The One-in, Two-out Executive
Order is a Zero, 166 U. PA L. REV. ONLINE 1, 1 (2017).
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Language in the Government Performance and Results Mod-
ernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA),54 which amended the Govern-
ment Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA),55 creates an
opportunity for an administration to integrate retrospective evalua-
tion of regulations with performance reporting and budget deci-
sions.  The GPRA requires agencies to set strategic goals, identify
measures that indicate progress toward those goals, set targets for
those measures, and report annually on progress.  Each agency is
expected to report annually on its success in hitting those mile-
stones and, if not, identify the reasons and identify new strategies to
improve performance.56  The GPRAMA requires agencies to iden-
tify high-priority goals every two years, report on progress toward
these goals quarterly, and identify every program, tax expenditure,
and regulation that contributes toward those goals.57
Budget recommendations based on assessments of regulation’s
actual effects are the President’s primary tool under GPRA to focus
public discussion on retrospective analysis in a way that could affect
decisions.  As part of an administration’s GPRA reporting, OMB
should require agencies to group related regulations and any ac-
companying guidance into regulatory programs and evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of these programs in accomplishing the agencies’
strategic goals.  Since most regulatory costs do not appear in the
federal budget, OMB should require agencies to assess the realized
public and private costs of their regulatory programs so the true
costs can be compared with the benefits.58
When agencies propose a regulation, OIRA should require
agencies to identify goals and measures, derived from the agency’s
strategic goals, that can be used to evaluate the regulation’s actual
effects after it is implemented.  Table 1, reproduced from the RIA
for a proposed Department of Homeland Security (DHS) regula-
tion to establish a program to biometrically identify visitors leaving
the United States, demonstrates how to match the results and mea-
sures of success for a regulation with a department’s strategic goals.
The table lists two departmental strategic goals, identifies the goals
54. Global Modernization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-352, 124 Stat. 3866.
55. Gov’t Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat.
285.
56. Managing for Results in Government, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
https://bit.ly/304iggP [https://perma.cc/2SYT-RT7S] (last visited July 6, 2020).
57. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., No. GAO-14-268, REEXAMINING
REGULATIONS: AGENCIES OFTEN MADE REGULATORY CHANGES, BUT COULD
STRENGTHEN LINKAGES TO PERFORMANCE GOALS 8 (2014).
58. See JERRY ELLIG ET AL., GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS:
AN EVALUATION OF GPRA’S FIRST DECADE 154–55 (2012).
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of the regulatory program that support these strategic goals, and
explains how the Department could measure the benefits associated
with each goal.
TABLE 1:  REGULATORY BENEFITS AND MEASURES TIED TO
DEPARTMENT’S STRATEGIC GOALS59
DHS Strategic  
Goal / Objective 
Supported 
US VISIT  
Goals / Objectives Exit Objectives  Exit Benefit  Measure  
Strategic Goal 2 – Prevention 
Strategic Objective 
2.1 
Secure borders 
against terrorists, 
means of terrorism, 
illegal drugs, other 
illegal activity  
Security 
Enhance the 
security of United 
States (U.S.) 
citizens and 
travelers. 
Biometrically 
verify aliens’ 
identity 
Increased National 
Security 
Qualitative in terms of cost of terrorism and reduction of 
costs due to border security as well as unquantified 
security benefits.  
 
Percentage of visa overstays (number of visa overstays 
detected as percentage of total alien travelers) 
Strategic Objective 
2.6 
Improve the security 
and integrity of our 
immigration system 
Integrity 
Ensure the integrity 
of the U.S. 
immigration 
system. 
Provide 
mechanism to 
identify visa 
overstays 
Improved Detection 
of Visa Overstays 
Cost savings from preventing a prior visa overstayer from 
entering U.S. (Subsequent detection and prosecution cost 
avoided) 
 
 
 
Dollar value of accurately matching records Accurate 
Matching of 
Arrival and 
Departure 
Records 
Improved Exit 
Processing over 
existing biographic 
systems 
Percentage of exit records matched to entry records 
(Number of exit transactions matched to entry transactions 
as percentage of total exit transactions) 
Value associated with the reduction of time spent seeking 
wanted persons no longer in the country 
Improved ICE 
Efficiency 
Attempting 
Apprehension 
Qualitative improvement in efficiency in geographic 
targeting of visa violators 
Improvement in 
Effectiveness of 
Government 
Resources 
Improved DIG 
Efficiency 
Processing 
Exit/Entry data 
Value of improved processing efficiency  
 
   Improved 
compliance with 
NSEERS 
requirements due 
to the improvement 
in ease of 
compliance 
Quantitative, not monetized: Increase in expected 
NSEERS compliance rates. 
  Facilitate travel Increase in 
economic activity 
created through the 
expansion in the 
number of Visa 
Waiver Program 
eligible countries 
Value of additional domestic economic activity created by 
the increased number of travelers arriving from countries 
with relaxed visa requirements. 
 
Measured but not included in the aggregate present value 
of benefits  
A 2014 GAO study notes that few agency executives participat-
ing in roundtable discussions with the study’s authors could identify
examples where the agency linked retrospective review of regula-
tions with assessments of agency progress toward its performance
goals under GPRA.60  GAO recommended that agencies should de-
59. U.S. VISITOR & IMMIGRANT STATUS INDICATOR TECH. PROGRAM, AIR/
SEA BIOMETRIC EXIT PROJECT: REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 67–69 (2008).
60. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 57, at 35.
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velop retrospective review plans when they adopt a regulation to
better integrate retrospective review with GPRAMA reporting:
Ensuring that agencies build in such performance metrics and a
timeline for evaluating regulations after implementation would
not only help facilitate retrospective analyses, but also help to lay
a foundation to more closely tie retrospective analyses to reviews
of broader agency priority goals.  Moreover, GPRAMA’s re-
quirements for agencies to identify and assess how their various
programs and activities, including regulations, contribute to
agency performance goals and APGs [annual performance goals]
further underscore the need for agencies to take such action.61
OMB’s guidance to agencies on implementing Executive Or-
der 13,771 takes steps in this direction.  It primarily requires regula-
tory agencies to establish performance indicators, goals, and targets
in their annual performance plans that would monitor the number
of retrospective evaluations, number of deregulatory actions, and
the net cost or cost savings from regulatory and deregulatory ac-
tions.62  Agencies customarily have at least one GPRA strategic
goal related to improved management, and these kinds of perform-
ance indicators are likely to fall under this catchall management
goal.  But the guidance also noted that agencies should develop per-
formance indicators and goals that would assess the contribution of
regulatory programs to their other priority goals:
In addition, agencies should establish and report other meaning-
ful performance indicators and goals for the purpose of evaluat-
ing and improving the net benefits of their respective regulatory
programs (i.e., all of the existing regulations in place that address
a specific regulatory objective).  This likely will require measur-
ing the costs and benefits of regulatory programs and setting
goals for improving those programs’ net benefits.  The effort to
improve net benefits may be conducted as part of developing
agency strategic and performance plans and priority goals, and
may use existing quarterly and annual performance review
processes to assess progress against these objectives.  Please con-
sult with your OIRA desk officer during your agency’s develop-
ment of new performance indicators for evaluating the net
benefits of regulatory programs.63
Experience with GPRA implementation for programs suggests
agencies need much more than a reporting requirement to drive
61. Id. at 34.
62. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET , supra note 8, at 3.
63. Id. at 3.
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improved regulatory analysis and performance.  Research shows
that the GPRA definitely improved the quality of performance re-
porting by many agencies.64  The quality of performance informa-
tion available to federal managers, and use of that information in
decisions, also improved, but results varied widely across different
agencies.65  Indeed, some reports concluded that GPRA did little to
systematically increase agencies’ use of performance information.66
In 2001, OMB noted that “[p]erformance measures are insuffi-
ciently used to monitor and reward staff, or to hold program man-
agers accountable.”67  Ten years later, OMB stated, “The ultimate
test of an effective performance management system is whether it is
used, not the number of goals and measures produced.  Federal per-
formance management efforts have not fared well on this test.”68
The Bush administration attempted to link budget recommenda-
tions to performance information,69 but congressional appropria-
tions committees chaired by members of the President’s own party
showed little interest in this information or in performance-based
budgeting generally.70
The 2014 GAO report on retrospective analysis and perform-
ance goals offers a cautionary note that motivates our next recom-
mendation:  “[A]dditional opportunities for improvement depend
in part on efforts to ensure that agencies are consistently held ac-
countable for implementing existing guidance.”71
B. Use Budget Recommendations to Enforce Analytical
Requirements and Achievement of Agency GPRA
Objectives
Agency RIAs often make some effort to comply with Execu-
tive Order 12,866, but still fall short of the standards envisioned in
the executive order.  Tying agency budgets to compliance with the
executive order is a tool that could underscore an administration’s
64. ELLIG ET AL., supra note 58, at 3–25.
65. Id. at 177–202.
66. See DONALD MOYNIHAN, THE NEW FEDERAL PERFORMANCE SYSTEM,
IMPLEMENTING THE GPRA MODERNIZATION ACT 10–11 (2013).
67. Id. at 11.
68. Id.
69. See Eileen Norcross, An Analysis of the Office of Management and
Budget’s Program Assessment Rating Tool 1–2 (Mercatus Ctr. at Geo. Mason
Univ., Working Paper, 2005); Eileen Norcross & Kyle McKenzie, An Analysis of
the Office of Management and Budget’s Program Assessment Rating Tool for Fiscal
Year 2007 2–3 (Mercatus Ctr. at Geo. Mason Univ., Working Paper, 2006).
70. ELLIG ET AL., supra note 58, at 203–20.
71. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 57, at 35.
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commitment to sound regulatory analysis.72  Direct budgetary con-
sequences would create a powerful incentive for agencies to im-
prove the quality and use of RIAs.  It would also provide an
unequivocal signal that the administration believes regulators
should understand the consequences of their actions before making
decisions.
Tighter integration of regulatory review with budget decisions
is hardly unprecedented.  From 1970 through 1976, OMB budget
officials conducted centralized review of regulations under what
was then called the Quality of Life Review (QLR) process.73  When
submitting proposed regulations, final regulations, standards, and
guidance documents for OMB review, agencies included a memo
discussing the anticipated benefits and costs of the action and of
alternatives.74  Jim Tozzi, one of the OMB officials responsible for
these reviews, noted that the involvement of budget examiners mo-
tivated agency compliance:
In understanding the significance and influence of the QLR re-
views, it must be recognized that they were conducted by the
budget side of OMB.  This meant that they were often conducted
or supervised by personnel who, as a result of their work on such
analyses in the Corps of Engineers, were experienced in con-
ducting benefit-cost analyses.  It also meant that the budget pow-
ers of OMB could be brought to bear on the agencies.75
Viewed in this light, our proposal represents a middle ground
between the QLR process (review of regulations by budget examin-
ers skilled in benefit-cost analysis) and the current practice (review
of regulations by OIRA experts in regulatory impact analysis).
The incremental regulatory budget adopted in Executive Or-
der 13,771 gives the administration an even more finely-honed tool
to link high-quality analysis with budgeting.  OMB could set an
agency’s regulatory budget, not just its fiscal budget, based in part
on how reliably an agency’s analysis of regulations demonstrates
that the agency is likely to achieve the intended results at a reasona-
ble cost.  This should not be a subjective exercise but one in which
OIRA develops quality standards and “grades” for RIAs.  OIRA
should publish the grades on its website.
72. See Christina Forsberg, Reducing Regulation 1 (June 11, 2009) (unpub-
lished manuscript) (on file with authors at Mercatus Ctr. at Geo. Mason Univ.).
73. Jim Tozzi, OIRA’s Formative Years: The Historical Record of Centralized
Regulatory Review Preceding OIRA’s Founding, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 37, 46 (2011).
74. Id. at 45.
75. Id. at 46.
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During the Obama administration, the OIRA developed a
checklist that indicates the major elements an RIA should con-
tain.76  The checklist also includes standards for the analysis and
data; for example, RIAs should rely on “the best reasonably obtain-
able scientific, technical, and economic information,” and the
agency should make its data, sources, and methods available on the
Internet so that others can replicate the agency’s findings.77  OIRA
could grade RIAs based on how well they comply with that check-
list.  OIRA may rely on the Information Quality Act and its checks
to help assure scientific quality.78
OMB budget review should include an assessment of the
agency’s success in achieving strategic goals via regulation at mini-
mum cost.  Regulatory programs should be discontinued if they
cannot or are unlikely to achieve goals in the near future, or if the
goal has been achieved or is no longer appropriate.79  This change
would leverage GPRA’s reporting requirements to prompt agencies
to develop an ongoing program of retrospective analysis of regula-
tions.  Assessing regulatory performance as part of the agency’s
budget review would strengthen the agency’s incentive to take ret-
rospective analysis and reporting seriously.
Achieving this goal requires delicate balancing within the exec-
utive branch.  OIRA should be responsible for developing mea-
sures and assessing compliance with the executive orders on
regulation.  OIRA should make recommendations to OMB budget
examiners.  Others higher up in the administration would finalize
the President’s budget recommendations to Congress.  The Presi-
dent’s budget should report specific agencies’ successes and failures
at achieving regulatory goals to ensure that Congress takes the re-
ports seriously.
In addition to rewarding agencies for better compliance with
executive orders, the President should recommend future agency
budgets to Congress based on achieving results.  This includes com-
pleting the required reports on achieving the goals and, in the
longer run, actually achieving those goals.  When agencies continue
76. OFF. OF INFO. & REG. AFF., AGENCY CHECKLIST: REGULATORY IMPACT
ANALYSIS (2010).
77. Id.
78. Presidential Threat Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 114 Stat. 2715
(requiring the Office of Management and Budget to promulgate guidance to agen-
cies ensuring the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information—includ-
ing statistical information—disseminated by federal agencies).
79. See Patrick McLaughlin & Richard Williams, The Consequences of Regu-
latory Accumulation and a Proposed Solution 46 (Mercatus Ctr. at George Mason
Univ., Working Paper No. 14-03, 2014).
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to expend resources on goals that are not achieved or are not
achievable, the President should recommend budget reductions
consistent with eliminating the nonworking programs.  When agen-
cies are acting on specific delegated authorities from Congress and
are unable to achieve results, the President should request legisla-
tion to fix poorly performing regulations.
C. Combine Regulatory Budgets with Agency Budgets
The most comprehensive way of combining evidence-based re-
view of regulations with budgetary consequences would be to fully
integrate regulatory budgeting with fiscal budgeting.80  Under one
proposal, the President’s budget would include proposed figures for
the cost of regulations for each agency that congressional budget
committees could use as part of their budget resolutions to limit the
annual cost of an agency’s regulations.81
Executive Order 13,771 already provides a framework that the
executive branch can use to budget regulatory costs.  The executive
order states that OMB should give agencies a projected cost, or cost
savings for the costs of their regulations for the coming fiscal year.
For example, the Department of Health and Human Services was
expected to reduce the cost of its regulations by nearly nine billion
dollars in fiscal year 2019.82  If agencies have not been producing
results in their regulatory programs, and subsequently have smaller
agency budgets for the forthcoming year, the President and Con-
gress should also decrease the budgets allocated to the agencies for
private regulatory expenses.
D. Reward Results, Not Activity
Agencies often state that they will hold executives accountable
for achievement of the agency’s strategic goals and objectives.83  It
is not clear that this happens.
Regulatory agencies, and particularly the regulatory staff,
often regard the production of regulations, rather than the produc-
80. See Jason J. Fichtner et al., Legislative Impact Accounting: Incorporating
Prospective and Retrospective Review into a Regulatory Budget, PUB. BUDG. & FIN.
40, 46 (2018).
81. See id. at 43.
82. OFFICE OF MGMT. BUDGET, REGULATORY REFORM: REGULATORY
BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019 1 (2019).
83. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Executive Performance
Management (2010), available at https://bit.ly/39wPXvy [https://perma.cc/5FPP-
ZSSB]; OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y OF DEF., SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE PERFORM-
ANCE PLANNING AND EVALUATION (1989), available at https://bit.ly/3jFEvTa
[https://perma.cc/D7YD-QXBS].
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tion of benefits for the public, as their primary output.  For exam-
ple, one of us worked at the Food and Drug Administration’s
Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition.  Outside of the
center director’s office was a chart that contained all the year’s reg-
ulations, with percentages of the number of regulations finished
compared to the planned number of regulations.
Using the number of regulations produced results in a bias to
adopt more regulations, regardless of the value of those regulations,
since a steady stream of new regulations indicates that the agency is
hard at work “solving problems.”  As one agency economist noted,
“Success is putting out 10 regulations a year and bigger regulations
are bigger successes.  They don’t say, ‘We examined ten regulations
and we decided that eight did not warrant regulation, which would
be better.’”84
Another former agency economist who worked on RIAs told
us that when money got tight, the agency started awarding plaques
in lieu of performance bonuses.  Typically, the “performance” that
merited the award of a plaque was the completion of a major regu-
latory proceeding.  “I had a colleague who deserved a dozen pla-
ques for regulations she stopped by asking the kinds of questions an
economist would normally ask,” he noted.  But plaques were a re-
ward for regulatory activity, not a reward for improvements in reg-
ulatory decisions.
Two managerial changes can help correct this problem.
First, the Executive Branch should evaluate and reward agen-
cies and their managers based on the demonstrated benefits they
produce for the public, regardless of whether those benefits stem
from new regulatory actions or decisions not to regulate.85  Agen-
cies should directly link those benefits to achieving agency perform-
ance objectives under GPRA.  In fact, OMB should reward
agencies for putting in realistic “triggers” that allow them, or any-
one, to check the outcome performance of a regulation at the ap-
propriate time(s).  For example, if the goal is to reduce obesity rates
by providing more useful information, an agency can take a survey
after the agency makes the information available and allows ade-
quate time for the regulation to produce results.  OMB should
make this information on regulatory results from all agencies avail-
able in a consistent format in one area on OMB’s website.
84. Richard Williams, The Influence of Regulatory Economists in Federal
Health and Safety Agencies 7 (Mercatus Ctr. at George Mason Univ., Working
Paper No. 08-15, 2008).
85. Clearly, putting forth “straw dog” regulations just so they can be rejected
would not be considered a successful performance outcome.
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Ideally, agencies should reward decision-makers for the actual
net benefits their decisions produce for the public, particularly
when it is possible to measure both.  This sounds like a tall order,
but as Ellig et. al note, “Though establishing causal links between a
regulation and outcomes may sometimes be difficult, it beats the
alternative:  blind faith that a regulation will accomplish the in-
tended results simply because we want it to.”86  To avoid creating
an additional incentive for biased estimates, OMB should base such
rewards on independent, external evaluations of regulatory pro-
grams’ effects, rather than agency self-evaluations.87  Of course,
there can be significant lags before goals are achieved, and it may
be difficult to attribute results to particular individuals.  In these
cases, agencies should be able to base rewards on known observa-
ble precursors of results.  The key point is that agencies should not
reward managers or staff based on regulatory activity or output.
Second, an administration can raise agencies’ and the public’s
awareness that the decision not to regulate, when appropriate, can
sometimes produce as much or more benefit to the public as a deci-
sion to regulate.  Agencies should be required to report annually on
the major instances in which they considered regulating but con-
cluded that federal regulation would not be appropriate, either be-
cause the problem was insignificant (or would soon become
insignificant), alternatives to federal regulation could better accom-
plish the regulatory objective, there is no federal regulatory solu-
tion, or the prospective costs exceeded the prospective benefits.
However, OMB should take care to ensure that agencies do not
artificially inflate these results by proposing unrealistic goals for
regulations and then deciding the regulations are not worth pursu-
ing.  It may be advisable to give an agency credit for not regulating
only when the agency rejects outside petitions for regulations that
fall into one of the above criteria.
Civil servants in agencies and OMB should be financially re-
warded for identifying regulatory programs that are not working.
The reverse is also true.  Civil servants, or groups of civil servants,
who either find better ways to implement existing programs or de-
velop new programs under existing laws that create net benefits for
citizens should also be financially rewarded.
These requirements would help correct current incentives that
prompt agencies to produce regulations in order to show that they
are productive.  If accompanied by solid, objective analysis, a list of
86. ELLIG ET AL., supra note 58, at 142.
87. See, e.g., ALDY, supra note 45, at 17–25.
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major decisions not to regulate would help build the case for re-
fraining from regulating when the evidence suggests caution is
warranted.
CONCLUSION
Citizens expect federal regulation to accomplish a lot of impor-
tant things, such as protecting us from financial frauds, preventing
workplace injuries, preserving clean air, and deterring terrorist at-
tacks.  Regulation also requires sacrifices.  Depending on the regu-
lation, consumers may pay more, workers may receive less, our
retirement savings may grow more slowly due to reduced corporate
profits, and we may have less personal freedom.  Regulatory impact
analysis is the key ingredient that makes these tradeoffs more trans-
parent to decision-makers and to the public.  So, understanding the
effects of regulation must start with sound prospective and retro-
spective regulatory impact analysis.  Tying agency budgets and per-
sonnel bonuses to effective analysis and, ultimately, positive
outcomes can go a long way to maximizing the value regulatory
agencies create for citizens.
OIRA is tasked with enforcing executive orders on regulatory
analysis and regulatory review.  But like George Washington at the
outset of the American Revolution, OIRA is “outgunned, outman-
ned, outnumbered, [and] outplanned.”88  In sheer size, OIRA will
inevitably play David to the administrative state’s Godzilla.  Our
proposals in Part II above are modest attempts to equip David with
some bigger and better stones.
88. Right Hand Man, supra note 1.
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